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Transatlantic Relations
after the Cold War: Theory,
Evidence, and the Future
Jo h n S. D uffield
One o f the more frequent subjects of Richard Ullman’s extensive scholarship
has been U.S.-European relations. And whether his primary purpose has
been to analyze the current state of affairs or to prescribe policy to transat
lantic leaders, he has always proved a perceptive observer and timely com
mentator. In the early 1980s, he endeavored to plot a route “out of the Eu
romissile mire” in which NATO had become stuck. Later that decade, he
illuminated the underlying imperatives for security cooperation that endured
even among estranged allies through his exposé of the “covert French con
nection.” As the Cold War began to wind down, he was one of the first to
grasp the potential opportunities for “enlarging the zone of peace” on the
continent and “securing Europe” as a whole. And where the rapid consoli
dation of democratic institutions and liberal values proved elusive, he did
not flinch from offering a sober assessment of the difficulties faced by the
West in addressing regional conflagrations, as in his analysis of “the world
and Yugoslavia’s wars.”
Even this very brief and incomplete survey suggests the considerable im
pact that Richard Ullman has had on our thinking about the close but often
conflicted ties shared by the United States and Europe in the postwar era.
Consequently, it is only fitting on this occasion to take stock of transatlantic
relations, especially as they have evolved since the end of the Cold War. An
underlying theme of this chapter is that, although many of the issues have
changed, especially in the realm of security affairs, the analytical perspec
tives emphasized by Richard Ullman in his teaching continue to be helpful
tools for furthering our understanding of the subject.
For some four decades after World War II, transatlantic relations were
shaped largely by two shared imperatives. Internationally, the imperative of
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containing Soviet power and influence did much to force convergence
among the foreign policies of the United States and its West European allies.
Domestically, the imperative of creating jobs and providing rising living stan
dards generated considerable impetus for the reduction of trade barriers, the
liberalization of capital flows, and macroeconomic coordination across the
Atlantic.
During the past decade, however, transatlantic relations have unfolded
within a rather different context. The first of these imperatives was largely re
moved by the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
No longer must the United States and Europe coordinate their political-military
affairs with a constant eye on Moscow. Although the second imperative re
mains important, its implications for transatlantic relations have become in
creasingly ambiguous as the West approaches the limits of the benefits of
economic openness and principled multilateralism.
Consequently, the period since 1990 has been a time of soul-searching in
U.S.-European relations.1 Fundamental questions have been raised about all
aspects of transatlantic ties. Will the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) be preserved and continue to play an important role in European se
curity affairs? Specifically, will the United States remain engaged militarily on
the continent? Will the transatlantic partners continue to enjoy high levels of
trade, or will they erect ever more barriers to one another’s products amid a
flurry of mutual recriminations? More generally, will the United States and
Europe work together to promote common interests, or will they increas
ingly find themselves at cross purposes?
Needless to say, observers have offered a wide range of answers to these
questions. Some have adopted a pessimistic stance, arguing that the founda
tions of postwar transatlantic cooperation have been irrevocably shattered
by the end of the Cold War (Mearsheimer, 1990; Walt, 1998). Others have
been much more sanguine, maintaining that those same foundations remain
largely intact (Kahler, 1996). And a third school of thought contends that
while serious fissures have opened up, they can nevertheless be closed
through concerted effort on both sides of the Atlantic, should the will to do
so exist (Gompert and Larrabee, 1997).
This lack of consensus, while frustrating to those looking for clear-cut an
swers, should come as no surprise. At bottom, it reflects divergent views
about the underpinnings of transatlantic cooperation during the Cold War
and the nature of the post-Cold War world. In order to assess the merits of
the various positions, therefore, it is necessary to clarify the assumptions on
which they are based and to spell out logically the implications of those as
sumptions in ways that enable us to weigh them against the accumulating
evidence.
A potentially valuable tool for this purpose is the scholarly literature on in
ternational relations. Much of this work is often zealously scrupulous about
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specifying its assumptions, deriving hypotheses, and, space and resources
permitting, subjecting the latter to careful empirical tests. Moreover, this lit
erature contains a range of theories that either have been previously applied
to questions of transatlantic relations or hold out the promise of helping us
to understand them.
In fact, the application of international relations theory to post-Cold War
transatlantic relations promises to be of benefit to scholars and policy mak
ers alike. For members of the academy, the recent history of U.S.-European
interactions offers a useful laboratoiy for evaluating and, if necessary, refin
ing theories that purport to explain patterns of interstate cooperation and
conflict. Indeed, a handful of scholarly works have tried to do just that (e.g.,
Haftendorn and Tuschhoff, 1993; Peterson, 1993 and 1996; Featherstone and
Ginsberg, 1996; Guay, 1999).
For their part, members of the policy community can profit from such an
exercise in at least two related ways. First, theory can suggest the types of de
velopments that are more or less likely to occur. As a result, policy makers
can focus their attention on more plausible scenarios. The following analy
sis shows, for example, that the more pessimistic assessments of transatlantic
relations are exaggerated. A significant decline in U.S.-European cooperation
is not inevitable. Rather, solid theoretical grounds exist for concluding that a
high degree of cooperation will remain possible well into the future. Never
theless, the glue that bound the United States and Europe together during the
Cold War is not as strong as it once was. Consequently, leaders who value a
strong Atlantic partnership cannot afford to become complacent but must be
pro-active in seeking to manage the relationship.
This conclusion raises the question of what types of steps should be taken,
and once again, theory can help to provide some of the answers. By priori
tizing the underlying causes of events, theory suggests where policy makers
should concentrate their efforts. The following analysis underscores the im
portant roles that international institutions play in transatlantic relations and
thus the need to be attentive to their possibilities and limitations. Another
finding concerns the stabilizing impact that flows of goods, investments,
people, and ideas across the Atlantic can have where these promote the de
velopment of better understanding, common values and interests, and even
mutual identification.
Accordingly, the chapter is divided into three parts. It first introduces three
leading theoretical perspectives on international relations— the realist, the
liberal, and what I term the transformational— and asks how each approach
would expect U.S.-European relations to evolve after the Cold War. It then
evaluates the usefulness of each perspective for accounting for the actual
pattern of transatlantic relations since 1990. To what degree do the events of
the past decade lend support to each of the three perspectives? In the third
part of the chapter, I draw on the preceding analysis to reflect on the likely
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future course of transatlantic relations and, where possible, to offer theoret
ically grounded prescriptions for their successful management in the next
decade and beyond.
Before proceeding, it may be useful to make explicit some of the limita
tions of the following analysis. In the first place, the portrait I intend to pres
ent will perforce take the form of broad brush strokes rather than a highly
detailed rendering of transatlantic relations. To accomplish much more in a
single chapter would be impossible. Consequently, some of the specific
events of the past decade may seem to fit poorly with the interpretation pro
vided. By the same token, the predictions and policy prescriptions offered
below must necessarily be pitched at a high level of generality. Second, it is
probably still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the subject.
Some important consequences of the end of the Cold War may not yet be
fully manifest. This possibility should serve only as a reason for caution,
however, not as a justification for deferring consideration of the topic.
Rather, it is incumbent on scholars to use the analytical tools at their disposal
to make informed judgments about such matters in a timely manner, even as
they acknowledge the provisional nature of their findings.

ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES AND THEIR EXPECTATIONS
Theories are useful tools for making sense of the world. They help us to gain
our bearings in the face of an often dizzying array of “facts” by providing
conceptual frameworks for ordering and selecting among those facts. At a
minimum, a theory should provide a map of the most important features of
the structure underlying the phenomena we wish to understand as well as an
indication of the relationships between those features and the processes that
connect them. In this way, it enables us to focus our attention on a relatively
small number of factors that may be particularly important in determining
the trajectories and outcomes in which we are interested.
International relations scholars have articulated a number of distinct theo
ries for explaining patterns of interstate cooperation and conflict. Indeed, to
the uninitiated, the diversity of specific theoretical approaches present in the
literature may seem bewildering. Nevertheless, most can be grouped into a
relatively small number of theoretical perspectives that reflect common as
sumptions about the nature of the most important actors and causal factors
in world politics.
Three theoretical perspectives— the realist, the liberal, and what I term the
transformational— hold particular promise as tools for understanding transat
lantic relations after the Cold War. As I will argue below, no single perspec
tive— and certainly no single theory—is able to account for all important as
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pects of the subject, especially one so complex and multifaceted. Each per
spective offers valuable insights. But some are clearly more useful than others.
The Realist Perspective: Power and Threats
Perhaps the most commonly invoked theoretical perspective on interna
tional relations is realism. The term “realism” has been used to describe a
number of specific theories, not all of which are compatible with one an
other. Despite such differences, however, most realist theories share a com
mon set of basic assumptions (Mearsheimer, 1994/95; Waltz, 1979): that the
main actors in international relations are sovereign states whose most funda
mental motive is to ensure their own survival; that most states have the abil
ity to inflict physical harm on and, in some instances, to destroy one another;
that the basic organizing principle of the international system is anarchy;2 and
that states can never be certain about the intentions or capabilities of others.
The most important consequence following from these assumptions is that
states are fundamentally insecure. The use of force is always possible in re
lations among them, and every state is a potential— if not an actual—-threat
to every other state, although some are more threatening than others. Con
sequently, “governments worry a lot about security and pay close attention
to potential threats” (Walt, 1998:8).
Two variants of realism are particularly relevant to the question of transat
lantic relations after the Cold War: balance of power theory and hegemonic
stability theory. Both offer pessimistic predictions, in the form of declining
cooperation and increasing conflict between the United States and Europe.
B a la n ce o f P ow er Theory
Balance of power theory argues that states will seek to balance the power
of threatening states.3 In order to do so, states will sometimes undertake uni
lateral balancing efforts. Where two or more states perceive a common
threat, however, they may engage in various forms of military cooperation,
including but not limited to forming a military alliance. The existence of a
common threat may also promote economic cooperation, since the eco
nomic benefits that accrue to either ally will enhance their combined power.
Conversely, the decline and, especially, the disappearance of the common
threat will undermine the basis for both types of cooperation. Military coop
eration will no longer be perceived as necessary, while economic coopera
tion may be viewed as dangerous, depending on the distribution of benefits,
since an erstwhile partner might be able to convert its economic gains into
greater relative military power (Grieco, 1988).
Balance of power theory explains postwar transatlantic relations, espe
cially its cooperative aspects, as a response to the commonly perceived Soviet
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threat. The military power and expansionist ideology of the Soviet Union
prompted the United States and Western Europe to form what was arguably
the most highly developed peacetime military alliance in history— NATO—
and to engage in high levels of economic cooperation. Whatever conflicts
might have existed between them were overshadowed by the need to main
tain a united front.
From this perspective, however, the collapse of the Soviet Union, by elim
inating the overriding common interest, should have deleterious conse
quences for transatlantic cooperation. First, the United States and its Euro
pean partners should perceive little to be gained from continued
participation in NATO while feeling ever more acutely the restrictions on
state autonomy imposed by alliance membership. Thus we should not ex
pect NATO to outlive the Cold War by long (Mearsheimer, 1990; Williams et
al., 1993; Harries, 1994). Moreover, the United States and Europe should be
come increasingly concerned about the relative gains of economic coopera
tion to the degree that each now represents the other’s greatest potential
strategic rival. As a result, we should also expect growing transatlantic con
flict in economic affairs (Asmus, 1997; Walt, 1998/99; Bergsten, 1999).
To be sure, some realists have appended caveats to this scenario. The for
mer Soviet threat, while greatly reduced, might nevertheless provide suffi
cient glue to hold the alliance together, at least in the medium term, given
Russia’s nuclear capabilities and unpredictable politics (Duffield, 1994/95).
Alternatively, other commonly perceived threats, such as terrorism or nu
clear proliferation, might suffice to fill, at least in part, the void created by the
collapse of the Soviet Union and serve as a basis for continued transatlantic
security cooperation. Nevertheless, the general thrust of balance of power
theory is pessimistic for U.S.-European relations.
H egem on ic Stability Theory
A second variant of realism, hegemonic stability theory, is hardly more op
timistic about the prospects for enduring transatlantic cooperation, albeit for
a different set of reasons. In contrast to balance of power theory, hegemonic
stability theory seeks primarily to explain patterns of economic relations. It
nevertheless shares with balance of power theory a healthy skepticism about
the prospects for cooperation. Also like balance of power theory, it identifies
a set of circumstances in which the usual hurdles can be overcome.
For hegemonic stability theory, however, these circumstances involve not
the presence of a common threat but that of a singularly dominant, or hege
monic, power. Through a combination of threats and promises, a hegemon,
can induce— or coerce— smaller states to open their markets and, more gen
erally, to adhere to common rules of commercial intercourse. By the same
token, a declining hegemon will find it increasingly difficult to elicit such be
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havior, and previously established cooperative economic arrangements will
tend to break down (Keohane, 1980).
Hegemonic stability theory has been invoked to account for the ups and
downs of the postwar Western economic order, especially its transatlantic
component. Following World War II, the United States, which had emerged
as the dominant power in the world, spearheaded the creation of a new set
of arrangements for the governance of international trade and financial rela
tions. Although these arrangements corresponded closely with American
preferences at the time, they nevertheless served the interests of most of the
other noncommunist developed countries. As the relative power of the
United States began to decline in the 1960s and, especially, the 1970s, how
ever, the postwar economic order was subjected to a series of shocks that
threatened to bring the whole edifice crashing down (Keohane, 1980).
In terms of hegemonic stability theory, the end of the Cold War per se has
no clear consequences for transatlantic relations. It may nevertheless coin
cide with a continuation, if not an acceleration, of America’s relative decline.
Not only have the countries of the European Union taken important steps to
ward economic integration and the creation of an economic power on par
with the United States, but other dynamic market economies, notably those
of East Asia, have emerged to pose serious challenges to U.S. ascendancy. In
such circumstances, the United States should be even less willing to shoul
der burdens of international leadership and less able to elicit behavior on the
part of others in accordance with established rules, with predictably negative
consequences for the stability of the postwar economic order (Sandholtz et
al., 1992; Thurow, 1992; Bergsten, 1999).
The Liberal Perspective: Institutions and Values
Not all of international relations theory offers such pessimistic views of
transatlantic relations after the Cold War. A second leading theoretical per
spective, what is often called “liberalism,” is much more positive about the
prospects for continued cooperation between the United States and Europe.
Liberal theories are not inattentive to the role of power and threats in shap
ing state behavior and international outcomes. They insist, nevertheless, that
international relations are far more than a rough-and-tumble scramble
among states for physical security. Two principal liberal approaches in par
ticular promise to speak to the question of transatlantic relations after the
Cold War: institutional theory and liberal democratic peace theory.
In stitu tion al Theory
Institutional theory, as developed perhaps most fully in the work of
Robert Keohane and his associates, shares a number of important features

244

Chapter 11

with realism. Like realism, it views states as the most important actors in
world affairs, treating them as largely unitary and rational. Similarly, it re
gards domestic politics as relatively inconsequential.
In contrast to most variants of realism, however, this liberal approach as
signs considerable importance to international institutions. Institutional the
ory starts from the premise that international relations are characterized by
numerous situations in which states could in principle achieve considerable
joint gains through concerted action but are often in practice prevented from
doing so because of transaction costs, uncertainty, fears of cheating, and
other obstacles to cooperation. Where such obstacles exist, however, states
can overcome them in order to realize the potential gains through the cre
ation of international institutions designed to lower transaction costs, reduce
uncertainty, deter cheating, and so on (Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Martin,
1995).
Once such institutions are established, participating states have strong in
centives to maintain them and to comply with the rules they contain. The
preservation of international institutions ensures the continuation of the ben
efits that they were originally intended to produce. Even when conditions
change and an established institution becomes less than ideal, participants
may find that it is difficult to construct superior institutional alternatives or
that the short-term costs of doing so outweigh the discounted present value
of anticipated gains. Moreover, it may be easier to adapt existing institutions
to meet new needs than to build new ones from the ground up. Only where
an institution becomes clearly dysfunctional will it be rational for member
states to cease to participate.
From the perspective of institutional theory, the end of the Cold War need
not spell the demise of transatlantic cooperation. In the security arena, post
war U.S.-European relations were conducted largely within the context of
NATO. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet
Union itself clearly deprived the alliance of one of its most compelling ratio
nales. But deterrence and defense against external aggression did not con
stitute NATO’s only purpose, and others, such as stabilizing relations among
the states of Europe, have attained new prominence with the decline of the
former Soviet threat (Duffield, 1994/95). It could be expected, moreover, that
NATO members would attempt to use such a highly developed and capable
organizational structure to address any new challenges that might arise in the
region, if not further afield (McCalla, 1996).
The implications of institutional theory for transatlantic economic relations
are less clear, given that the United States and Europe established few pri
marily transatlantic institutions to govern their interactions in this area dur
ing the Cold War. Nevertheless, the transatlantic partners were the principal
architects of and the major players in the broader Western institutional struc
tures created after World War II to promote economic cooperation, such as
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Mon
etary Fund (IMF), and, later, the Group of Seven (G-7). Thus insofar as these
institutions continue to represent valuable tools for pursuing U.S. and Euro
pean economic interests and coping with global economic difficulties, one
should expect continued compliance with their dictates even as individual
states seek to modify their functions, structures, and rules in order to better
suit the states’ current needs.
L iberal D em ocratic P ea ce Theory
Liberal democratic peace theory represents an even greater departure
from the tenets of realism. In particular, it rejects the assumption that states
can be treated as unitary actors, contending instead that due attention must
be given to the individuals and private associations that constitute society,
the values they hold, and the domestic institutions that serve to aggregate
their value-based preferences into state policy (Moravcsik, 1997).
Liberal democratic peace theory has been developed over the past decade
and a half to explain a striking empirical anomaly: the fact that no two lib
eral democracies have ever gone to war with each other. To account for this
phenomenon, international relations scholars have advanced two comple
mentary theoretical arguments concerning the roles of democratic political
institutions and liberal values, respectively (Doyle, 1986; Owen, 1994). Dem
ocratic political institutions can make it difficult for a state to move toward
war until it is sorely provoked. The existence of a free press and open pub
lic debate can make it harder for leaders to act in secrecy. Regular, competi
tive elections ensure that those same leaders can be held accountable for
their actions and thus punished if they resort to war without good reason or
public support. And the distribution of foreign policy decision-making au
thority among multiple bodies or individuals means that steps toward war
will be slower and more cumbersome.
The presence of such domestic institutions is no guarantee of pacific be
havior, however. Not only have democracies participated in wars with no
less frequency overall than their authoritarian counterparts, but they have
sometimes even initiated military conflicts. Thus it is also important to con
sider how these institutional effects can be reinforced by liberal values. Lib
eral societies place a high intrinsic value on each individual and his or her
well-being. Typically, this value is accompanied by a depreciation of war as
a means of progress, given its potentially high cost in human terms, except
where the use of force may be required to ensure the community’s security
or, in extreme cases, to preserve liberty and justice. Instead, liberal societies
exhibit a strong preference for peaceful methods of resolving disputes and
regulating competition. A further consequence is that societies marked by
liberal values will have a special affinity for one another. They tend to regard
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each other as fundamentally just and peaceful and thus deserving of accom
modation, whereas illiberal states will be viewed as hostile and potential
threats (Doyle, 1986).
Arguably, the contribution of liberal democratic peace theory to under
standing transatlantic relations during the Cold War is relatively small. The
United States and Western Europe had good reason to cooperate with one
another when confronted with the power and expansionist ideology of the
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, liberal democratic peace theory may help to ex
plain why the transatlantic partners came together so readily and why they
cooperated so extensively, creating institutions (like NATO) without prece
dent (Risse-Kappen, 1996). It also helps to account for the limits they placed
on security and, especially, economic cooperation with illiberal states such
as Greece, Spain, and Portugal until the 1970s and 1980s.
The expectations of liberal democratic peace theory for transatlantic rela
tions after the Cold War are similarly indefinite. While this approach may pre
dict the absence of military conflict between the United States and Europe, it
cannot forecast with any precision the forms of active cooperation in which
they are likely to engage. Perhaps the most that can be said at this point is that
they should possess a shared interest in preserving democratic institutions and
liberal values at home and promoting their spread abroad where possible.
The Transformational Perspective:
Changes in Beliefs, Interests, and Identities
The third theoretical perspective that I will consider, what I term the
“transformational,” is derived from the broader set o f theories that seek to
explain international relations and state behavior in terms of ideational fac
tors, such as belief systems, images, cognitive maps, collective identity, and
culture. The term transformational is intended to distinguish those theories
that emphasize the protean nature of the beliefs, values, interests, and even
the identities of the actors in international relations and call for more atten
tion to how and why such ideational phenomena may change over time. As
such, transformational approaches share liberalism’s critique of realism and
build on the insights of the former, especially its emphasis on the role o f val
ues.4 At the same time, however, they implicitly criticize liberalism— and
other existing idea-based theories— for offering too static a picture of world
politics.
L earn in g Theory a n d S ocial C onstructivism
The two most prominent transformational approaches are learning theory
and social constructivism. Learning theory, which was the first to be devel
oped, is just what it claims to be: a theory of what and how actors— typically
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individual policy makers— learn from experience, observation, and study. In
its most basic form, it concerns any changes in the beliefs and values held by
these individuals rather than connoting some form of human progress; learn
ing can be maladaptive and dysfunctional as well as productive and benefi
cial (Levy, 1994).
Scholars have typically differentiated between two types of learning. Sim
ple learning involves changes in factual knowledge and cause-effect beliefs.
This type of learning is manifested when actors alter the strategies they em
ploy to achieve a fixed set of goals. Complex learning, in contrast, involves
changes in values, interests, and the basic goals of policy themselves. Thus
this second type of learning may result in even more profound behavioral
modifications (Nye, 1987).
Social constructivism, which borrows heavily from modern social theory,
requires a bit more explication. The starting point of constructivist analyses
is the assumption that the agents in any social system are not autonomous
but, rather, are embedded in social structures of shared norms that do much
to define their interests and identities. Such arrangements of agents and
structures are not static but evolve over time through a process of mutual
constitution: the actions (physical and communicative) of agents shape and
reshape the normative structures, which simultaneously constitute and re
constitute the agents (Wendt, 1995 and 1999).
The intensity of such transformational processes can vary considerably, al
though most social constructivists would maintain that they are always pres
ent to some degree. What is important for our purposes, however, is the idea
that repeated interactions among states and the people who compose them
can result in changes in their interests and even their identities over time.
Moreover, this process can easily go beyond the development o f comple
mentary interests and similar identities (e.g., as liberal democratic states) and
lead instead to the emergence of common interests and a common identity
(e.g., as an Atlantic community), an identity that could perhaps even serve
as the basis for the construction of a new polity and that might exclude oth
erwise similar states located elsewhere.
In addition, there are good reasons to expect that the types of transforma
tional phenomena posited by learning theory and constructivism will occur
with particular frequency in the context of formal international institutions.
Membership in such institutions is likely to alter the nature of interstate and
transnational interactions in ways that facilitate the processes of interest and
identity formation. Other things being equal, interactions among the indi
viduals that represent participating states and various unofficial actors are
likely to be of greater frequency, intensity, density, and duration than those
among nonmembers. This effect should be characteristic of a wide variety of
types of interactions, including direct human contacts, the establishment of
transnational and transgovernmental links, information flows, and resource
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transfers (Risse-Kappen, ed., 1995). Thus although institutionalist theory and
social constructivism start from very different premises, international institu
tions should play a prominent role in many constructivist accounts of inter
national relations.
H ypotheses a b o u t T ran satlan tic R elations
The transformational perspective is perhaps the least useful for ex
plaining transatlantic relations during the Cold War (Risse-Kappen, 1995).
What it would emphasize during that period is not the impact of accumu
lating changes in beliefs, interests, and identities but the very occurrence
of such changes in the context of frequent and highly institutionalized
transatlantic interactions. Since ideational changes of this type are likely to
be gradual in nature, their behavioral consequences should require some
time to emerge.
The post-Cold War era, however, is probably not too early a period in
which to expect such consequences to become manifest. Thus transforma
tional approaches would suggest that, independently of the continued exis
tence of common threats, interlinking international institutions, and shared
liberal democratic traditions, transatlantic relations after the Cold War should
be different from what they might otherwise have become because of fun
damental changes in the nature of the United States and the European coun
tries, or at least in the beliefs and values held by their elites, mass publics, or
both (Wendt, 1992:417-418).
The exact nature of the likely impact of such changes on U.S.-European
relations is harder to specify; it depends crucially on the precise ways in
which— and the degree to which— beliefs, values, interests, and identities
have evolved under the impact of transatlantic interactions over the previous
four decades. As a working hypothesis, however, one might posit, for ex
ample, the existence of altered beliefs (especially in the United States) about
the interdependence of U.S. and European security and thus the value of
continued American engagement in European security affairs. Closely re
lated might be convergent transatlantic interests in European peace and sta
bility, and not only because of the corresponding economic benefits. And
some scholars have gone so far as to claim the emergence of a transatlantic
security community based on a common identity (Risse-Kappen, 1995). Such
developments would militate strongly in favor of a high level of continued
cooperation, perhaps especially in the area of security.

WEIGHING THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
Three leading theoretical perspectives offer often contrasting expectations
about the likely course of transatlantic relations after the Cold War. How do
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these expectations hold up against the empirical record since 1990? Although
even a decade of experience is perhaps too short a period on which to base
firm conclusions about so broad a subject, it should provide us at least with
some indication o f likely trends.
Before attempting to draw any conclusions, however, it is important to
make note of the most obvious difficulties that will attend such an effort.
Three related problems stand out. First, a good deal of uncertainty exists
regarding the expectations of each theory. In order to make more accurate
predictions, it is necessary to have more detailed descriptions of the
causal antecedents that each approach emphasizes. Concrete realist hy
potheses are likely to be the easiest to generate, since the configurations
of power and threat that they emphasize are relatively easy to specify, al
though, in fact, subjective perceptions of them may vary considerably. In
contrast, the task of ascertaining the beliefs, interests, and identities
stressed by transformational theories may be quite demanding and fraught
with pitfalls.
Second, even if the achievement of greater specificity were possible, the
various theories considered above would not necessarily offer rival hy
potheses. Thus the same phenomena may provide support for more than
one approach. The task of differentiating between the outcomes predicted
by the liberal and transformational perspectives, respectively, will be espe
cially challenging. Nevertheless, it should be relatively easy to distinguish
between the generally pessimistic expectations about transatlantic coopera
tion of realist theories and the more optimistic ones of their liberal and trans
formational counterparts.
Third, even where hypotheses can be clearly differentiated and where ev
idence seems to be consistent with the expectations of one theory or an
other, it may be difficult to establish with any certainty that the causal factors
emphasized by that theory were indeed responsible for the observed out
come. In any case, to do so with a high degree of confidence would require
a much more detailed examination of the evidence than is possible within
the confines of a single chapter, since one may need to inquire into the mo
tives and calculations of multiple decision makers. Here, it will be possible
only to examine the broad contours of transatlantic relations since 1990 and
not to delve into primary sources.
With these caveats in mind, I now evaluate the usefulness of the three per
spectives for understanding the recent evolution of U.S.-European relations.
How should one go about doing so? Each of the theories considered above
purports to explain the presence or absence of cooperation among states.
Consequently, one should begin by looking for evidence of transatlantic co
operation. International cooperation has been usefully defined as “the vol
untary adjustment by states of their policies so that they manage their differ
ences and reach some mutually beneficial outcome” (Grieco, 1990:22; see
also Keohane, 1984:51-52). With this broad definition as a starting point, one
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might further distinguish among three more specific forms of cooperation in
situations where policy preferences diverge:
• Making an effort to address common challenges or problems jointly,
rather than acting independently. In some cases, this will involve using
appropriate preexisting institutional fora.
• Exhibiting a willingness to compromise one’s preferred course of action
in order to achieve common policies. In some cases, this will entail the
creation of new institutional structures or the modification of existing
ones.
• Faithfully implementing common policies, even where this involves
some cost or inconvenience in comparison with unilateral action. In
some cases, this will involve complying with agreed institutional rules.
In conducting this analysis, consider first the security and then the economic
aspects of the subject. Although this organizational structure is somewhat ar
bitrary and, more importantly, may obscure important links between the two
components and tend to marginalize other significant aspects of transatlantic
relations, it is nevertheless common in the literature and thus should facili
tate comparison with other works.
Transatlantic Security Relations
The post-Cold War record in the area of security affairs provides consider
able support for the liberal and transformational perspectives. Despite a
number of episodes involving strained transatlantic ties, many of which
seemed to confirm realist expectations, the United States and Europe have
continued to engage in high levels of security cooperation. Along the way,
they have transformed NATO into an institution that is better able to address
their likely future security concerns in the region and thus can serve as a
sturdy platform for joint action. Harder to establish is the role of transforma
tional processes in accounting for these and related developments.
E v id en ce o f C ooperation a n d C onflict
To be sure, many developments in the early to mid-1990s suggested that
the realist dynamic of alliance disintegration would prevail in transatlantic
security relations. As the Soviet threat declined, NATO countries engaged in
rapid, largely unilateral force reductions and troop withdrawals, raising
questions about the viability of the alliance’s integrated military structure. Si
multaneously, a number of European states, including many NATO mem
bers, expressed an interest in developing strong pan-European and/or West
European security structures, suggesting that the old alliance with the United
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States was no longer deemed necessary or at least that the U.S. role in Eu
rope could be significantly reduced.
In addition, NATO was almost immediately buffeted by challenges of a dif
ferent nature, which placed in stark relief the question of the alliance’s con
tinued relevance to the problems of European security after the Cold War.
These challenges stemmed from the allies’ differing responses to the con
flicts that wracked the former Yugoslavia, beginning in mid-1991- Initially, of
course, the desire of the Europeans to take the lead in dealing with the con
flicts and U.S. willingness to defer to them resulted in a brief period of
transatlantic harmony. The failure of these European efforts as well as those
of the United Nations to put an end to the fighting and the concomitant
recognition of the need for NATO involvement, however, soon brought U.S.European differences to a head. One result was the early impasse triggered
by the American proposal for a policy o f “lift and strike” in Bosnia, which
found little support on the continent. Such episodes of paralysis generated
in turn a chorus of cries, especially in the United States, that NATO either had
to go “out of area” or it would go out of business. And even where the allies
could agree in principle to act, as on the policy of enforcing the U.N.declared no-fly-zone over Bosnia, they frequently clashed publicly over the
precise measures to be taken in response to violations. Clearly, the nature of
the threat posed by ethnic conflict in the Balkans was not sufficient to com
pel a unified front (Ullman, 1996).
At approximately the same time, the NATO allies began to disagree openly
over the desirability of admitting new members from Central and Eastern Eu
rope. Although perhaps never as heated as the intra-alliance debates over
what to do about Bosnia, the enlargement issue nevertheless further mani
fested the fissiparous tendencies existing within the alliance after the Cold
War. Indeed, one realist has described it as the clearest sign of an eroding
strategic consensus (Walt, 1998:19)When all is said and done, however, it is clear that no fundamental break
down has occurred in transatlantic security cooperation. To the contrary, the
United States and Europe have continued to try to work together on regional
security issues and have usually been able to overcome their differences in
order to arrive at and carry out common policies. NATO has been not only
preserved but substantially modified, both doctrinally and structurally, in or
der to be better able to address the likely challenges of the future. As a re
sult, it remains a central— and, in many cases, the central— focus of the se
curity policies of its members. Indeed, even France, which severed its
military ties to the alliance in the 1960s, has seen fit to involve itself once
again in NATO’s defense bodies.
Likewise, the early concerns raised by the prospect of alternative Euro
pean security structures turned out to be misplaced. Less progress has oc
curred than many had initially hoped or feared, in no small part because of
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the transatlantic alliance’s continuing utility. And insofar as new structures
have been established, they have been increasingly viewed as complemen
tary to rather than competing with NATO, which has itself taken steps, such
as the development of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, to
ensure their mutual compatibility.
Finally, the United States and the Europeans were able to work through
their most important initial differences on the question of enlargement in the
span of a few years, paving the way for the admission of three new members
from Central and Eastern Europe in 1999- Likewise, they were ultimately able
to achieve a high level of cooperation in Bosnia, beginning with the en
forcement of U.N. sanctions in the mid-1990s and continuing through a half
decade-long deployment of peacekeeping forces there. The Bosnia experi
ence was followed by a much less contentious process of decision making
and joint military action in response to the subsequent crisis in Kosovo,
notwithstanding the lack of a clear U.N. mandate.
A ccou n tin g f o r C ooperation
More difficult than describing this generally cooperative pattern of out
comes is the task of accounting for it in terms of the three theoretical per
spectives outlined above. Even realists— never ones to concede a point
readily— might argue that, notwithstanding the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the United States and Western Europe faced common threats of sufficient
magnitude to ensure continued security cooperation. In the face of a nuclear
armed Russia, actual and potential ethnic conflicts on their borders, and the
new risks posed by proliferation and terrorism, the allies may not yet have
been ready to go their separate ways. In terms of the material factors em
phasized by realism, however, it is hard to see why the United States pos
sesses a stronger interest in institutionalized security cooperation with Eu
rope than it did, say, during the interwar years or immediately after World
War II, both occasions on which it sought to disengage. And even if U.S. en
gagement were not problematic, the particular form that transatlantic coop
eration has taken— the preservation of NATO— and the ways in which the
organization has been used are not readily accounted for by balance of
power theory.
Instead, the trajectory of post-Cold War transatlantic security relations
seems less puzzling when viewed through the lenses provided by the liberal
and transformational perspectives. Institutional theorists can explain NATO’s
persistence in terms of the utility and adaptability of existing international in
stitutions. Even if the nature of the security challenges facing the United
States and Europe changed, as they did to a significant extent, it was always
more efficient to rely on NATO and to make organizational adjustments as
necessary than to react to events on an ad hoc basis. Thus an alliance that
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had once emphasized the deterrence of threats and acts of aggression against
its members has been employed to stabilize and promote reform in the states
of Central and Eastern Europe and, where actual hostilities occurred, to co
ordinate international military interventions for the purposes of peacekeep
ing and peace enforcement. Indeed, all of these operations would have been
much more difficult, if not impossible, to mount in the absence of NATO’s
organizational machinery. With the acquisition of experience and the devel
opment of new capabilities, moreover, such new cooperative ventures could
be undertaken with ever greater speed, confidence, and efficiency— com
pare NATO’s responses to the Bosnian and Kosovo crises, respectively.
The other strand of liberalism considered in this chapter, liberal demo
cratic peace theory, would emphasize the specific types of strategies jointly
employed by the United States and Western Europe to enhance their security
after the Cold War. The allies were not content simply to wall themselves off
from potential dangers, to engage in military cooperation with nonmembers
insofar as possible, or to extinguish regional military conflicts. To the con
trary, they have placed at least as much emphasis on transforming former ad
versaries into fully fledged members of the community of liberal, democratic
states. Thus the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (now the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council), the Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the NATO en
largement process concerned not only the creation of new security ties but
also the export of Western models of civil-military relations, transparent de
fense policy making, treatment of national minorities, and the like. Likewise,
the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo have been closely linked to the goal
of constructing political communities based on the principles of tolerance
and representative government in those devastated regions.
Harder to establish is the impact of the types of factors emphasized by
transformational perspectives, although this difficulty should not discourage
us from looking for their influences. It would be an exaggeration to state that
the United States and Europe have developed a common identity that could
serve as a solid foundation for cooperation— indeed, such a claim would be
premature even in the case of the members of the much more integrated Eu
ropean Union— although the first elements of such a transatlantic identity
may be present. Even where American and European security interests seem
to have coincided, moreover, it would be reckless without much more care
ful analysis to attribute such coincidences wholly to earlier interactive
processes rather than to the common strategic circumstances of the moment.
Nevertheless, we can adduce at least some evidence for the existence of
transformational phenomena in the rationales offered by political leaders for
the policies that their respective states have pursued. These include, for ex
ample, frequent references to the United States as a European power, one
with a permanent role to play in the security affairs of the continent (Hol
brooke, 1995). Today, such views, which would have found few adherents
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following either of the world wars, seem much more than just wishful think
ing. By the same token, very few American elites today regard renewed iso
lationism as a responsible option.
Perhaps even more striking have been the justifications provided by polit
ical leaders in Germany, which is arguably the European linchpin of transat
lantic security cooperation. The Federal Republic, more than any other Eu
ropean state, has been transformed by its participation in NATO and its close
relations with the United States during the postwar era. Consequently, suc
cessive German governments of varying political stripes have been ardent
supporters of the alliance and continued strong security ties with the United
States, including an American military presence on German soil, to an extent
that seems to exceed even what can be rationalized in terms of the expected
practical benefits of such a policy (Duffield, 1998).
Finally, one might point to evidence of ongoing learning since the end of
the Cold War with regard to how to respond to ethnic conflict in the Balkans
and perhaps elsewhere on the continent. Having started at different posi
tions, the transatlantic partners now appear to have arrived at a consensus
about the importance of timely intervention, the need for American leader
ship, and the utility of NATO. These altered beliefs no less than the institu
tional changes that have occurred in the alliance are necessary for explain
ing the differing Western responses to fighting in Croatia, Bosnia, and
Kosovo. In a similar manner, U.S. and European views about the meaning
and value of European efforts to develop an autonomous capability for mil
itary action have exhibited considerable convergence.
Transatlantic Economic Relations
A similar pattern of outcomes and influences would seem to obtain in the
area of transatlantic economic relations since the end of the Cold War. Here,
too, one finds some empirical support for the increasingly conflictual dy
namics predicted by realism. The preponderance of evidence, however,
points in the direction of a liberal interpretation. Whether transformational
processes have played much of a role is more difficult to say.
E v id en ce o f C ooperation a n d C onflict
As realists might have anticipated, U.S.-European economic relations have
been characterized by a number of high-profile disputes, especially in the
area of trade. Whether the issue was bananas, hormone-treated beef, and
Hollywood movies or more arcane subject like export subsidies and the ex
traterritorial application of American sanctions, such disputes have made
headlines and raised concerns that transatlantic commercial ties might soon
be strained to the breaking point. And at the beginning of the 1990s, the
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Uruguay Round of global trade negotiations came close to collapse, largely
due to transatlantic differences.
Yet the overall record of transatlantic economic relations is one of contin
ued cooperation, notwithstanding attention-getting disagreements. The
United States and Europe have continued to try to work together on eco
nomic issues, seeking amicable solutions to their conflicts. These efforts
have included the creation and elaboration of formal arrangements between
the United States and the European Union (EU) for the bilateral discussion of
nonsecurity issues, including biannual summits at the presidential level, as
called for in the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration (Kahler, 1995: 6 l; Reinicke,
1996: 42-43; Eichengreen, 1998: 1).
With regard to the area of trade, one should also remember that highprofile disputes are not a purely post-Cold War phenomenon. To the con
trary, they have long been a staple irritant of transatlantic relations, even if
the specific bones of contention have changed over the years. Moreover, im
portant past objects of conflict, such as strategic trade with the Soviet bloc,
access to resources in the developing world, and the protection of agricul
ture, have been diminished with the end of the Cold War, a steady decline in
the price of most commodities, and significant reforms in the EU’s Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Kahler, 1995: 2-3).
What really matters, in any case, is the broader impact of such disputes,
and this impact appears to have been modest, if not negligible. Disputes in
one area have not readily spilled over into others but have remained largely
contained.5 In absolute terms, moreover, the level of transatlantic trade re
mains substantial, at around 20 percent of the U.S. total.6
It is also noteworthy that the United States and the EU were ultimately able
to overcome the deep differences that had obstructed global trade negotia
tions and to achieve agreements that served as the basis for the successful
1993 conclusion of the Uruguay Round, which resulted in the establishment
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Not only were the principles gov
erning trade in manufactured goods extended into new areas, such as ser
vices and intellectual property rights, but they were supplemented with new
decision-making bodies and dispute settlement procedures. Since then, the
two sides have regularly taken their grievances to the WTO and have sought
to comply with its rulings rather than resorting to unilateral measures in or
der to obtain redress.
The evidence in the area of monetary relations is more ambiguous. The
post-Cold War era has seen no major conflicts in this area thus far. Never
theless, the degree of transatlantic coordination in response to the financial
crises— first in Mexico, later in Asia— that threatened to bring down the
global financial system has been less than ideal. Moreover, it is too soon to
assess the consequences of the establishment of a monetary union among
eleven European states in 1999 (Eichengreen and Ghironi, 1998).
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A ccou nting f o r C ooperation
To an important extent, it seems possible to account for this general pat
tern of continued cooperation in terms of the multiple international institu
tions of relevance to transatlantic economic relations. In contrast to the se
curity realm, however, many of these institutions are global rather than
purely regional in nature or, if not global, include one or more extraregional
states. One important general mechanism for policy coordination has been
the G-7, to which Japan and Canada belong. Although the G-7 is only loosely
institutionalized, its annual summit meetings provide a unique forum for the
discussion of issues and the achievement of consensus among the world’s
largest industrialized countries. During the first half of the 1990s, the G-7
served as a principal venue for the coordination of Western assistance to the
former Soviet Union. With a larger, though still far from universal, member
ship and a lower profile is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), which provided a forum for the negotiation by the
United States and Europe of an agreement on measures to limit corruption
by their corporations (Schott, 1998: 59).
The most developed set of international institutions governing transat
lantic economic relations have been those concerned with trade, especially
the GATT and its successor organization, the WTO. The existence of these
complex frameworks of rules and procedures, and the benefits that they
generate in terms of market access and the regulation of competition, has
given the United States and Europe additional strong incentives for seeking
to contain and resolve their differences. Indeed, these global institutions
have reduced barriers to transatlantic trade to such an extent that relatively
little would likely be gained from any purely bilateral liberalization mea
sures, such as a U.S.-EU free trade area in services and industrial goods
(Schott, 1998: 41).
As for monetary relations, transatlantic cooperation is pursued in a variety
of international institutions, including the G-7, the OECD, the IMF, and the
Bank of International Settlements (BIS). In contrast to trade, however, this
realm is characterized by few specific rules and relatively weak mechanisms
for policy coordination (Eichengreen and Ghironi, 1998). Consequently,
should serious U.S.-European conflicts ever arise in this area, it may be pos
sible to attribute them in at least part to the absence of adequate institutional
arrangements.
The liberal democratic nature of the societies involved may have also
played a role in promoting transatlantic economic cooperation, albeit a more
indirect one. On balance, cooperation seems to have been favored by the
level and nature of economic interdependence that has existed between the
United States and Europe. While a high volume of trade increases the po
tential for conflict across the Atlantic (Eichengreen, 1998:1), it also raises the
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stakes, providing both sides with an incentive to make sure that disputes are
resolved or at least contained. In addition, transatlantic trade is highly bal
anced, thereby removing a source of rancor that repeatedly roils U.S. rela
tions with Asia. Finally, cooperation has been undergirded by continuing
high levels of direct investment, which has a strong positive impact on
trade.7 Economic interdependence is in turn, however, strongly associated
with liberal democracy. In particular, recent studies have found that demo
cratic states trade significantly more with each other than they do with states
that have other types of political systems (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares,
1998).
Considerable evidence also suggests that transformational dynamics have
been present. U.S. and European concepts about the proper ordering of the
world economy have undergone considerable convergence during the post
war era. Whereas the United States and its principal European allies were fre
quently at odds over such issues as imperial preference half a century ago,
they have developed highly similar, if not always identical, preferences for
economic openness and market competition (Kahler, 1996; Guay, 1999).
Whether this convergence can be attributed primarily to the types of
processes posited by the transformational perspective is harder to establish.
Nevertheless, at least one perceptive observer has argued that “five decades
of close collaboration have produced societies on either side of the Atlantic
that share broadly common views on international economic governance”
(Kahler, 1996:24).

CONCLUSION: FINDINGS, FUTURE
PROSPECTS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This chapter has inquired into the usefulness of three leading theoretical per
spectives for understanding transatlantic relations after the Cold War. It has
found that realist approaches, while providing a useful starting point for
analysis, are unable to account for the general pattern of considerable coop
eration that has continued to characterize relations between the United
States and Europe in both the security and economic arenas. Balance of
power theory and hegemonic stability theory both predict a decline in co
operation as a result of the end of the Soviet threat and American hegemony
vis-à-vis Europe, respectively.
Instead, the record of the past decade is much more consistent with the
expectations of liberal theories of international relations. As institutional the
ory would predict, the strong security and economic institutions created by
the transatlantic partners in the wake of World War II and in response to the
Cold War have continued to serve as valuable instruments for addressing
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their concerns and pursuing their national interests. As a result, the very ex
istence of these institutions has both facilitated and generated strong incen
tives for continued cooperation, even as they have been modified and sup
plemented to conform better to the exigencies of the post-Cold War era.
While the predictions of liberal democratic peace theory are not as specific,
it too is nevertheless compatible with the high degree of cooperation wit
nessed between the United States and Europe.
Hardest of all to assess is the contribution of the transformational per
spective to an explanation of transatlantic relations. Certainly, the pattern of
continued cooperation is not inconsistent with this approach’s emphasis on
the effects of convergent beliefs, interests, and even identities. Rather, the
problem lies in establishing with any degree of confidence that such trans
formational dynamics have indeed occurred and that they can be primarily
attributed to the interactive processes that transformational approaches pre
suppose, as opposed to some other (perhaps random) mechanism. This
problem, however, is not an absolute one but an artifact of the relative nov
elty of these theoretical approaches, the relatively greater difficulty of mea
suring the ideational variables that they emphasize (in comparison with
power distributions or international institutions), and the relatively limited
resources that scholars have thus far devoted to exploring their validity.
In fact, further research on the subject of transatlantic relations is likely to
result in new theoretical syntheses in which the transformational perspective
is treated as an essential complement to realism and liberalism as scholars
find it increasingly difficult to disentangle the causal processes posited by
these various approaches. This is because the impact of seemingly objective
factors such as power and institutions on international relations is necessar
ily mediated by the perceptions, meanings, and understandings that are at
tached to them. Thus how one responds, for example, to Germany’s eco
nomic power and military potential is largely a function of what one might
expect Germany to do with the resources at its disposal. Likewise, the utility
of a particular international institution such as NATO is as much a learned or
imagined quality as it is something that can be straightforwardly divined
from the organization’s formal structures and processes. Consequently, it
may ultimately be impossible to understand realist and liberal dynamics ex
cept through a transformationalist lens that helps to explain how the world
came to be perceived and understood in a particular way.
A final observation concerns the sufficiency of the theoretical perspectives
employed in this analysis. While one or more of them may be necessary to
understand post-Cold War transatlantic relations, they are not necessarily
able to account, singly or jointly, for all of the events and trends of the past
decade that one might deem important. Although each of the three perspec
tives is pitched in broad terms in order to embrace multiple theories, they do
not by any means encompass all of the theoretical approaches that might be
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of use in this enterprise. Indeed, the very nature of these approaches may
obscure important features that are essential to a more fully satisfying un
derstanding of the subject.
As a first step, it may be useful to question the tendency of the preceding
analysis to treat Europe (or at least Western Europe) as a single entity. Al
though this assumption is perhaps more reasonable than at any time in the
past in view of the impressive strides made recently by the EU, the truth re
mains that the region is populated by a number of distinct nation-states that
often hold conflicting interests on particular issues. Indeed, these intraEuropean differences may at times be as substantial as those that character
ize transatlantic relations as a whole. Thus it may be advisable to disaggre
gate Europe and to explore the additional obstacles and opportunities for co
operation that such a model suggests.
Going a step further in this direction, it may sometimes be useful to dis
aggregate the states themselves into their constituent parts, such as govern
ments, which may in turn be separated into their executive, legislative, and
judicial components; societies, which may in turn be divided along lines of
economic interest, class, ethnicity, and so on; and the various institutions of
interest representation that link the state and society. Such an analytical
move may help to highlight additional important constraints on or pressures
for cooperation as well as aid in the process of identifying strategies for over
coming the former and harnessing the latter.
Both of these departures from the simpler model employed in this chap
ter suggest the potential relevance of the family of theories that concern the
primarily domestic sources of foreign and security policy. Indeed, it may be
impossible to comprehend particular trade disputes or the zig-zagging
course of allied discussions on the question of NATO enlargement without
reference to such factors. Nevertheless, it is useful to begin an analysis of this
type by examining how far theories that consider the transatlantic system as
a whole, rather than the often idiosyncratic characteristics of its component
parts, are able to take us.
Future Prospects
What does the preceding analysis suggest about the future course of
transatlantic relations? Clearly, attempts at political forecasting are fraught
with potential pitfalls. Often, it is impossible to anticipate developments that
prove to be primary determinants of future events. Could but Western lead
ers have foreseen the rise of a national-socialist dictatorship in Germany, the
world might have been spared a second global conflagration. Likewise,
those in positions of political power at the end of World War II could hardly
have imagined the degree to which relations with the Soviet Union would
deteriorate during the following five years.
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Nevertheless, if one is to prognosticate, one cannot dwell on the unpre
dictable. And perhaps the best we can do is to project recent trends into the
future, even as we recognize the possibility of departures from a linear path.
In that case, the prospects for transatlantic relations are generally bright. We
can anticipate a continuation of the generally high levels of cooperation be
tween the United States and Europe that have prevailed during the past
decade. Such an optimistic forecast also follows from a consideration of the
factors emphasized by the theoretical perspectives that we have found par
ticularly useful for illuminating post-Cold War U.S.-European relations thus
far. The liberal and transformational perspectives provide good grounds, es
pecially when taken together, for expecting continued cooperation, notwith
standing the greater potential for conflict, or at least a drifting apart, that the
realist perspective identifies.
In the first place, the United States and its European partners remain wellestablished liberal democracies that will be naturally inclined to cooperate in
the many areas in which their interests coincide. And where their interests
diverge on specific issues, they will tend to evince understanding of each
other’s positions and to exercise restraint in their dealings with one another,
placing sharp bounds on the potential for conflict.
In the second place, the United States and Europe remain jointly en
meshed in a number of well-developed international institutions that simul
taneously provide opportunities and good reasons for continued collabora
tion. Most of those that were created during the Cold War have been
successfully adapted, like NATO, so as to maintain their relevance in the face
of new international realities and in some cases, such as the WTO, given ad
ditional powers. Moreover, some new ones, including the first purely transat
lantic arrangements for the discussion of political and economic issues, have
been established. Although these institutions and their operation have them
selves at times been at the center of disagreements, they remain, on balance,
valuable instruments for the pursuit of national interests. Thus their partici
pants are likely to continue to work through them and to respect the limits
that they place on national action even in cases where doing so seems dis
advantageous.
One further word on the liberal perspective may be in order at this point.
Thus far, I have treated institutional theory and liberal democratic peace the
ory as distinct approaches to understanding international relations. In fact,
however, they are complementary insofar as international institutions and
liberal democracy are mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, liberal demo
cratic states are more likely to create and maintain international institutions
than are other types of states. One reason for this is the intrinsic value that
liberal democracies place on cooperation. Another is the importance as
signed to the mle of law in such societies. The development of international
law and organizations is merely the extension of familiar law-governed do
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mestic processes to the international sphere. On the other hand, interna
tional institutions will be not only more abundant among liberal democracies
but also more consequential. Liberal democracies are more likely to regard
the rules institutions contain as authoritative and binding and thus to treat
those rules with deference. This further line of argument suggests the exis
tence o f even stronger grounds for expecting a continued high level of
transatlantic cooperation after the Cold War (Kupchan, 1999).
Finally, as the transformational perspective would emphasize, the United
States and Europe may have grown through a half century of frequent and
wide-ranging interactions into convergent ways of thinking about them
selves, their interests, and one another that reinforce the institutions and lib
eral values that already dispose them toward cooperation. Externally, they
have been increasingly bound by the shared goal of enlarging the areas of
the world that possess functioning market economies and are governed by
the rule of law. Vis-à-vis one another, in the words of a leading German ob
server of transatlantic relations, “the distinction between foreign and domes
tic policy has blurred as [their] societies have interwoven,” a process that
seems only likely to accelerate with the growth of the internet {N ew York
Times, 28 May 2000; see also Guay, 1999).
Of course, the possibility remains that, in the long run, corrosive realist pres
sures may ultimately prevail over these cooperative tendencies. Nor can one
guarantee that all the circumstances that currently promote cooperation will
not change. For example, the relative, if not absolute, degree of transatlantic
economic interdependence— and thus the consequences of a fundamental
rupture— could decline as more and more U.S. trade shifts from Europe to
Asia. As a result, the United States could become increasingly willing to take a
hard line vis-à-vis Europe in defense of its perceived economic interests.
In addition, there is uncertainty about the implications of the further evo
lution of the EU. The 1990s witnessed first the completion of a single Euro
pean market largely free of barriers to the movement of goods, services, cap
ital, and labor, and then the successful introduction of a true European
economic and monetary union (EMU) involving a common currency and a
single central bank, the feasibility of which had long been doubted. Now the
EU is poised to streamline its internal decision-making processes in prepara
tion for the accession of new members from Central and Eastern Europe and
to add a tme capacity for military action.
As a result of these developments, relations with the United States could
be strained in two somewhat contradictory ways. On the one hand, such sig
nificant integrative steps would seem not only to evidence the existence of a
Europe that was more willing and able than ever to assert its independence
but also to set the stage for drawn-out future conflicts over both economic
and security policies between more evenly matched rivals. On the other
hand, problems with the EMU and enlargement could cause the EU to turn
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inward, hampering efforts at transatlantic economic cooperation (Eichengreen and Ghironi, 1998).
Policy Implications
In short, the road ahead is unlikely to be an entirely smooth one. Just as
during the last decade, the transatlantic relationship will encounter frequent
bumps and the occasional pothole. Thus the generally optimistic picture
painted above should not be allowed to foster complacency. To the contrary,
the forward progress of U.S.-European relations will always stand to benefit
from active management and enlightened leadership. This observation
seems especially true in view of the fact that some important sources of post
war U.S.-European cooperation, particularly those emphasized by the realist
perspective, are no longer present or much reduced. Consequently, the pos
sibility that misdirected policies— or the absence of policy— could eventually
lead to a fundamental breach in the relationship, although perhaps small, is
not negligible. The good news is that the situation is not entirely beyond hu
man control. Today’s and tomorrow’s leaders have it in their means to take
steps that can help to preclude an extensive breakdown o f cooperation.
What prescriptions follow from the theoretical perspectives considered in
this paper? Once again, it is necessary to begin by qualifying what can be
achieved here. It is no more possible to derive highly specific policy guid
ance from such broadly framed theoretical perspectives than it is to offer de
tailed predictions about transadantic relations. A tradeoff usually exists be
tween the range of instances to which a theory might apply and the degree
to which it can illuminate a specific case. Consequently, perhaps the most
that can be hoped for are very general guidelines, including an indication of
the types of conditions and policy instruments to which policy makers
should devote their attention.
When it comes to offering advice, realism is in one respect the least use
ful of the three perspectives, since the factors that it emphasizes are the least
subject to conscious manipulation. There is not much one can do about the
loss of the unifying Soviet threat or about the relative decline of American
power vis-à-vis Europe. Nor would it be worth attempting to resurrect the
Soviet threat or to construct a substitute merely for the sake of preserving al
lied unity even if one could do so.
Nevertheless, realism can help to suggest the forms of cooperation that are
more or less possible and sustainable in the altered geopolitical circum
stances of the post-Cold War era. In the area of security affairs, it makes clear
that a high level of U.S. involvement in Europe will be more difficult to jus
tify and thus to sustain than in the past, absent the reemergence of a com
pelling threat. Consequently, it behooves the Europeans to take the steps
necessary to become collectively a more equal military partner of the United
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States, one that can bear a greater share of the burdens of regional defense—
and now peacekeeping— efforts than they have been able to do thus far, and
it behooves the United States to encourage this process. To be sure, the
United States may sometimes chafe at having to relinquish the dispropor
tionate influence over NATO policy that has come with being the dominant
member of the alliance. But this equalization of U.S. and European roles will
be compensated for by a commensurate readjustment of their respective re
sponsibilities and the elimination of lingering European resentments.
Similarly, in the area of economic affairs, realism underscores the impor
tance of establishing and maintaining a balanced relationship. In the absence
of a hegemonic power, asymmetrical flows of goods and capital risk prompt
ing the erection of trade barriers and controls on investment. Indeed, this
goal would already seem to have been largely achieved, at least in compar
ison with other bilateral relationships, thereby creating a relatively sound
foundation for future U.S.-European economic ties.
The liberal perspective offers a different but complementary set of pre
scriptions. Institutional theory instructs policy makers to be attentive to the
role that international institutions can play in promoting cooperation. Thus it
would caution against moving too hastily to abandon or dismantle existing
international institutions, even if they seem outdated, and would instead un
derscore the importance of identifying the ways in which they may continue
to be of use, even if some modifications are necessary. Likewise, while rec
ognizing that the creation new institutions is not the solution for every thing
that ails transatlantic relations, it reminds us that they can sometimes help to
resolve specific sources of conflict. Thus, as noted above, a transatlantic free
trade agreement would probably not represent any improvement upon the
WTO. But with traditional trade barriers having been largely eliminated,
there may be a place for new U.S.-European institutions that could address
so-called behind-the-border issues, such as differences in government regu
lation and corporate taxation (Kahler, 1995; Reinicke, 1996).
For its part, liberal democratic peace theory emphasizes the value of pro
moting the inculcation of liberal values and the establishment democratic in
stitutions in countries that lack them and preserving them where they al
ready exist. Liberal democracy seems well-entrenched in the countries
covered in this analysis. Thus the most immediate prescription that follows
from this theory is the need to seek to enlarge the “zone of peace” (Ullman,
1990) within Europe, if only as a means of reducing the likelihood and mag
nitude of crises and conflicts in neighboring areas that might strain transat
lantic relations. In fact, Western leaders would seem to have already under
stood this lesson, judging by the efforts that they have made to promote
political and economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe.
In this regard, the two strands of liberal theory considered in this paper
come together. Although regional institutions serve a number of purposes,
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they have proven themselves to be among the most useful instruments for
fostering liberal democracy where it is not already present. This goal has in
formed some of the most noteworthy NATO initiatives of the past decade,
such as the PFP, as well as the EU’s more gradual but nevertheless significant
progress toward strengthening ties with Central and Eastern Europe. Al
though the potential drawbacks of admitting additional countries into NATO
and the EU, especially if done so too hastily, should not be minimized, nei
ther should they be allowed to justify interminable delays in the enlargement
process.
Perhaps less obvious is the fact that international institutions will also have
a role to play in preserving the impressive liberal democratic gains that were
achieved within the existing transatlantic community during the postwar era.
Here the case of Germany is especially instructive. Although German de
mocracy may be no less inherently stable than democracy in other West Eu
ropean countries, it may be potentially more subject to corrosive external
pressures because of Germany’s central geographical location on the conti
nent and its heavy dependence on exports. Thus policy makers should bear
in mind how NATO and other European security structures can help to buffer
Germany against potentially disruptive security threats, while the EU and the
WTO can help to ensure access for German products in foreign markets.
Because of the relatively undeveloped nature of the transformation per
spective, it is perhaps the least capable of generating concrete guidance for
policy. At a minimum, it is useful for reminding policy makers that national
beliefs, interests, and even identities are not immutable. Rather, these im
portant determinants of state policy and international relations are them
selves malleable and, indeed, somewhat subject to conscious manipulation.
Thus policy makers eager to sustain transatlantic cooperation should be ever
on the lookout for ways of fostering common understandings and interests.
Typically, such transformational dynamics are associated with interna
tional contacts and the flow of people, information, and material resources
across national boundaries. Such exchanges, moreover, are likely to take
place in the context of or be promoted by international institutions. Conse
quently, policy makers should be attentive to— and prepared to exploit— the
transformational potential of NATO and other transatlantic institutions, even
if these were established for different reasons and continue to be justified on
other grounds.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to be much more specific at this point, given
that transformational processes are still poorly understood. Much more re
search is required in order to clarify the mechanisms through which and the
conditions under which national perspective, interests, and even identities
may grow together. Scholarly efforts directed toward this end are likely to be
well worthwhile, however, because of their substantial potential policy rele
vance, and not just for the management of transatlantic relations.
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NOTES
1. One need only examine the titles of many of the books that have recently ap
peared on the subject. See, for example, Coker, 1998; Geipel and Manning, 1996;
Kaase and Kohut, 1996; Serfaty, 1997; and Weidenfeld, 1996.
2. By anarchy, in this context, we do not mean a state of chaos; international rela
tions can be quite orderly, even from a realist perspective. Rather, anarchy means a
lack of hierarchy and, in particular, the absence of any central authority capable of
enforcing agreements between states or of protecting them if they are threatened or
actually attacked by one another.
3. The most rigorous presentation of balance of power theory remains Waltz
(1979). A valuable refinement focuses on the role of threats, rather than power alone,
in stimulating balancing behavior (Walt, 1987).
4. Indeed, insofar as liberal democratic peace theory emphasizes values as op
posed to formal domestic institutions, it too falls within this expansive camp.
5. For example, the tariffs (approximately $300 million) that the United States has
threatened to impose on European products over the banana and beef-hormone dis
putes would amount to only about one-tenth of 1 percent of the total volume of
transadantic trade.
6. In 1996, the EU ranked just behind Canada as the leading U.S. partner in mer
chandise trade ($270 billion in total exports and imports versus $290 billion) (Schott,
1998: 38-39).
7. In 1998, 44 percent of all U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) was in Europe,
while 58 percent o f all FDI in the United States originated in the EU (Guay, 1999: 82;
see also Schott 1996: 41 and 44). According to one estimate, trade between parent
firms and their affiliates on the other side of the Atlantic amounts to one-third of all
transadantic trade (Schott, 1996: 44).
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